When do individuals actually improve their financial behavior in response to advice? Using survey data from current defined-contribution plan holders in the RAND American Life Panel (a probability sample of US households), we find little evidence of improved DC plan behaviors due to advice, although we cannot rule out problems of reverse causality and selection. To complement the analysis of survey data, we design and implement a hypothetical choice experiment in which ALP respondents are asked to perform a portfolio allocation task, with or without advice. Our results show that unsolicited advice has no effect on investment behavior, in terms of behavioral outcomes. However, individuals who actively solicit advice ultimately improve performance, in spite of negative selection on financial ability. One interesting implication for policymakers is that expanding access to advice can have positive effects (particularly for the less financially literate); however, more extensive compulsory programs of financial counseling may be ultimately ineffective.
Introduction
As policymakers in the United States and elsewhere focus on the difficult problem of increasing access to unbiased financial advice in the context of self-directed retirement plans, a key question is whether implementing potentially costly reforms and regulations is likely to bring about the desired changes in behavior. In this paper, we therefore address the open research question: do individuals actually improve their financial behavior in response to advice? If policymakers successfully increase the availability of neutral financial advice, will participants actually seek and implement the advice they are given?
We present two complementary observational and experimental analyses of investors and advice that are relevant to 401(k) plans. In observational analyses, we observe real investment outcomes from real planholders, but our inferences about the effect of advice are limited by two problems -self-selection into advice, and reverse causality -that are not mutually exclusive. In experimental analyses, we are restricted to hypothetical investment choices, but we are able to eliminate both selection and reverse causality. By comparing and contrasting our results, we are able to draw on implications from both.
Firstly, we draw a sample of 401(k) plan participants from a nationally representative household survey. We examine self-reported patterns of advice use, and estimate correlational relationships between reported advice and plan-related outcomes (savings, investment, and decumulation). We find no consistent statistically significant predictive relationship between reported use of an advisor in 2008 and contemporaneous plan-related outcomes. This result is in marked contrast to previous research that finds significant positive correlations between portfolio quality and the use of advisors (Bluethgen et al (2008) ; Hackethal et al(2009)) .
While this provides a meaningful description of real behavior, the data do not allow us to comment on likely causal relationships (or the lack thereof) between advice and behavior. Advice itself is a choice variable, and participants who receive advice may likely be self-selected on particular characteristics. One argument is that individuals may be positively or negatively selecting into advice based on their underlying financial literacy: individuals with low financial literacy may be compensating by using advisors. Unlike previous studies, we are able to include explicit measures of financial literacy when controlling for observables, allowing us to directly examine this hypothesis. Our results reveal little correlation between financial literacy (whether objective or self-assessed) and having consulted an advisor in 2008; in addition, controlling for financial literacy in the predictive analysis does not qualitatively alter the results. Overall, the data analysis is consistent with little or no selection based on financial ability alone. However, this still does not rule out selection on other key unobserved characteristics, including opportunity costs of time, trust and individual preferences for self-reliance. Further analysis also suggests that reported consultations in 2008 reflect concerns specific to a period of extraordinary financial stress. More importantly, reverse causality may be a more significant problem than selection: observed advice-seeking may be the result of significant changes in financial situation or unusually poor portfolio performance, leading.
In the second analysis, we turn to experimental methods to try to better understand the causal relationship between advice and behavior. We design and implement a hypothetical choice experiment in which participants are asked to perform a portfolio allocation task. While we are restricted to the analysis of hypothetical outcomes, rather than real plan outcomes, there are several advantages to the experimental analysis. Firstly, the advice provided is completely uniform in content. Secondly, the issue of reverse causality does not arise. Respondents are randomly assigned to one of three study arms. The first arm is a control group, in which the task is presented to respondents without any advice. Respondents in the second arm, the default treatment group, all receive the same financial advice. In the third arm, the affirmative decision group, respondents are given the choice of whether to receive the advice. Only those who choose advice receive it. Comparing the three groups allows us to study the effects of advice given as matter of course versus the effects of advice given as a result of requiring an active rather than a passive decision.
Our experimental results demonstrate that when advice is given automatically, the impact is negligible i.e. there is no average causal effect of advice on investment behavior, when advice is randomly assigned. We also test for heterogeneous treatment effects, by financial literacy and various demographic categories and find no consistent patterns. In contrast to the default group, we find a large and statistically significant positive relationship between advice and behavior within the affirmative decision treatment group. Individuals who choose to receive advice do better than individuals who receive advice by default. Conversely, individuals who choose not to receive advice do worse than individuals who do not receive advice by default. While financially literate respondents perform significantly better in the task overall, we are able to rule out the possibility of positive selection on financial literacy. In fact, the opposite appears to be true: respondents select into advice based on lower financial literacy. These results are consistent with selection on unobservable motivation: individuals who are more motivated are more likely to select advice, and also to perform better on the task. However, selection explains only part of the story. On average individuals in the affirmative decision treatment outperform individuals in both the control and the default treatment, implying a positive causal effect of the intervention. We also estimate positive average effects of treatment-on-the-treated, using assignment to treatment as an instrumental variable. These results show that individuals are more likely to follow advice when they seek it out, rather than when the same advice is provided automatically and for free.
For policymakers, the lessons about advice are mixed. One key implication is that having employers offer advice as an elective and ensuring employees' active decision-making is indeed likely to result in significant take-up and some improvement of financial outcomes, and employees with low financial literacy are more likely to take advantage of these programs. On the other hand, going further and making the provision of advisory services mandatory for every employee may be extremely costly but achieve no real behavioral change. Furthermore, in many situations, policymakers have recommended compulsory financial counseling as a remedy; these results suggest this is not likely to work if the recipients are not inherently prepared to take the advice. In general, the problem with motivation is extremely challenging.
Background
Interactions between individual investors and financial advisors have changed considerably over the past few decades as financial service providers have expanded their range of services, and individuals have taken on greater responsibility for their own financial wellbeing. In March 2009, Americans held 6.8 trillion dollars in self-directed retirement plans (ICI, 2009) . However, work in behavioral finance suggests that, when left to their own devices, whatever their preferences, expectations, and background risks, investors do not make optimal investment decisions in their defined contribution plans. Instead, they tend to use heuristics or simple decision rules to make their initial allocation decisions (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; Agnew et al., 2005; Hewitt Associates, 2004; Investment Company Institute, 2001; Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) . Investing "mistakes" and simple rules of thumb can have significant welfare implications, given that households may not invest according to optimal portfolio choice theory (Dominitz and Hung, 2007) 1 . Some of these "mistakes" may be attributed to individuals' lack of financial management skills: Mitchell (2006, 2007) argue that investing is a complex undertaking that requires consumers to gather, process, and project data on compound interest, risk diversification, and inflation, as well as to accumulate knowledge of the asset universe. Their findings suggest that most of the U.S. population is not sufficiently financially literate to cope with the shifting burden of post-retirement planning to the individual. Hackethal, Haliassos and Jappelli (2009) note that in theory, financial advisors could ameliorate consequences of differential financial literacy, improving returns and ensuring greater risk diversification among less sophisticated households. Indeed, using advisors allows households to benefit from economies of scale in portfolio management and information acquisition, because advisors can spread these costs among their clients. However, consumer advocates argue that investors that may be unprepared to make the best decisions for themselves may also be more vulnerable to bad advice: exploitation by affiliates of broker-dealers or investment companies who benefit from advising them to buy unsuitable products (Hung, et al. 2008) . People who consult advisors and do not follow through may also not benefit from good advice, as their knowledge may not translate into actual behavioral change.
Much attention has been paid, by policymakers and academics alike, to the pitfalls of bad investment advice. The theoretical and empirical economics research literature on investment advice has largely been concerned with the moral hazard problem inherent in the advisor-advisee relationship (see, for example, Liu, 2005 , Hackethal, Haliassos and Jappelli, 2009 , Inderst and Ottaviani, 2009 . Similarly, regulatory and legislative debate related to self-directed pension plans in the US has focused on how best to mitigate the risk of exposing unsophisticated plan participants to manipulation while still allowing access to advice. The Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 2006 facilitated provision by granting exemptions to definedcontribution (DC) plan providers under level-fee compensation arrangements or for advice given by an unbiased computer model. Newly proposed legislation, on the other hand, suggests barring any plan provider from giving advice to participants, as well as the elimination altogether of managed accounts.
On the other hand, perhaps surprisingly, relatively little information exists about whether good investment advice really works. Although regulators and legislators are deeply engaged in a significant effort to make financial advice more accessible to the everyday investor in a neutral setting, the practical benefit in terms of behavior change of achieving such a policy goal should not be regarded as a foregone conclusion. Indeed, there is remarkably little empirical evidence about individual responsiveness to financial advice outside an environment with moral hazard.
There is a long-standing literature on general advice-taking and receiving, rooted in psychology and organizational behavior. The findings on the propensity to seek advice are mixed and highly-context dependent: studies find results that vary from resistance to advice-seeking, even if it is free (Gibbons, 2003) or nearly universal advice-seeking (Gino, 2008) . Uncertainty about decisions, however, is found to predict advice seeking . Although it is difficult to draw conclusions about when individuals seek advice, the research literature strongly suggests that individuals who do solicit advice are more likely to follow that advice than individuals who receive unsolicited advice (Gibbons, Sniezek and Dalal, 2003) . Indeed, a robust finding is that individuals who receive advice by default tend to significantly discount it (Bonaccio and Dalal, 2006; Yaniv, 2004a; Yaniv, 2004b; Yaniv and Kleinberger, 2000) . While explicitly solicited advice is perceived as helpful, unsolicited advice or imposed support is perceived as intrusive and can even lead to negative responses (Deelstra, 2003; Goldsmith, 2000; Goldsmith and Fitch, 1997) . In a similar vein, Gino(2008) shows that individuals are significantly more receptive to advice that they pay for, rather than advice they get for free.
Little empirical work has been done that specifically addresses the context of investment advice, particularly in a sample representative of participants in DC plans. Much of the psychology-based evidence has been gathered in the laboratory using tasks that are unrelated to investment management. It is difficult to extrapolate from the experimental laboratory-based literature on financial incentives, as the results are mixed: Sniezek and Van Swol (2001) and Sniezek et al (2004) find that financial incentives decrease advice discounting but in contrast, Dalal (2001) finds the opposite. In the economics literature, the evidence suggests that although investors often express desire for more advice, it is unclear how and when they implement the advice they are given (Helman et al, 2007) . Furthermore, since investors actively choose whether or not to seek out advice, any correlations between actual behavior and advice may be the result of self-selection: individuals who are particularly prone to certain types of investing behavior may also be more likely to seek out advisors. Hackethal et al (2009) find that self-selection largely explains their finding of better outcomes for advisees in the context of German internet brokerage accounts, and suggests a theory of "babysitters", where wealthy individuals outsource their financial management to others. However, these online brokerage clients are likely to represent a population with experience and objectives that are quite different from the average US DC planholder. Kramer(2009) also finds that portfolio allocations of Dutch investors vary with advice, but performance does not. While some behavior in 401(k) plans such as trading activity has been found to be correlated with advice (Agnew, 2006) , a causal relationship has not been well-established.
Study Setting and Data Collection

The RAND American Life Panel
The primary data collection instrument, an investment behavior survey, was administered to 2224 members of the RAND American Life Panel (ALP). The ALP is an Internet panel of respondents 18 and over. Respondents in the panel either use their own computer to log on to the Internet or a Web TV, which allows them to access the Internet using their television and a telephone line. The technology allows respondents who did not have previous Internet access to participate in the panel. ALP members are recruited from among individuals age 18 and older who respond to the monthly Survey of Consumers conducted by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center. The monthly survey produces, among other measures, the widely used Index of Consumer Sentiment and Index of Consumer Expectations. Upon joining, respondents to the ALP complete a separate survey about individual demographic, work history and other household information, which they are prompted to update each time they log in to a new module. This provides a series of self-reported demographic characteristics of interest, including birthdate, gender, education, ethnicity, occupation, state of residence and income.
MS 73 Behavior Survey Sample
The behavior survey was administered as wave MS73 of the ALP between 6/05/2009 and 6/22/2009. We note that the ALP population as a whole tends to have more education and income than the broader U. S. population. There are two main reasons for this sample selection. First, the Michigan respondents tend to have more education than the population at large, as described by Census data. Second, the great majority of ALP members have their own Internet access.
Americans with Internet access tend to have more education and income than the broader population. As such, for survey data analysis, we apply population weights to all survey response. For the experimental data analysis, the data remains unweighted.
MS 64 Financial Literacy Survey Sample
For a subset of 1467 individuals, we are able to match the behavior survey to a previous survey of financial literacy, based upon which we compute an index of measured financial literacy as well as an index of self-assessed financial literacy. The first index is computed from respondents' answers to questions related to basic numeracy skills and knowledge of investments, retirement plans and insurance, while the second is based on respondent's own judgment about their abilities. Details of the construction of the indexes can be found in Hung, Meijer, Mihaly and Yoong (2009) .
Survey Evidence on Financial Advice And DC Plan Participant Behavior
Individuals from the panel who report being enrolled in a current employer's defined contribution plan were asked whether they had consulted a financial advisor for individual recommendations regarding their DC plan. Table 1 shows the final survey sample size determination and weighted demographic composition for this group of 618 individuals.
The Propensity to Seek Advice
In 2008, 17-22% 2 of employees with defined-contribution plans consulted an advisor ( Table 2 ). The breakdown by demographic composition shows that proportionally, more women and minorities consulted an advisor in 2008 regarding their DC plan. Older, more educated and wealthier individuals were also more likely to have consulted an advisor.
We estimate a linear probability model with reported advice-seeking in 2008 as the binary outcome variable. In the LP model, the coefficients may be interpreted as the best linear predictor (BLP) of changes in the probability of the outcome associated with a unit change of each regressor 3 . For individual i, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the equation
where Y i , takes the value of 1 if the respondents received advice, X is a vector of commonly-used observable demographic characteristics and  is an individual error term. Column 1 of Table 3 shows that while the regression coefficients mirror the pattern observed in the summary statistics, among the various demographic characteristics, there are few statistically significant individual predictors of actual reported advice-seeking in 2008 apart from marital status.
2 It should be noted that 25 respondents individuals were erroneously omitted from the survey sample for the question about advice received in 2008. In addition, 3 individuals gave no response. Summary statistics on the use of advisors in 2008 by demographic category are computed omitting the observations with missing values (in the first column of Table 2 ). Column 2 of Table 2 shows estimates for the sample calculated using imputed probability of use for the 25 missing values based on observed use in the group of individuals who make direct withdrawals, under the (strong) assumption that this probability is equal for all individuals who make early withdrawals. This probability is taken to be equal to the observed prevalence of advice in the group of individuals who make direct withdrawals is 20%. We also show the maximum and minimum possible bounds for the true full-sample statistic, computed using the extreme assumptions of 0 -100% takeup for the omitted group, noting that the low overall use of advice for the rest of the sample suggests that the true sample mean is likely to be at the lower end of this range.
The Relationship Between Advice And Reported DC Plan Behavior
Our data show that most DC plan holders continued actively making contributions to their plans in 2008, and that slightly more than half of plan assets were held in stock. However, a large fraction of respondent portfolios featured at least one common investment mistake. Although respondents report that they most value advice for investing purposes, use of an advisor appears to have little relationship to investment portfolio quality.
In this sample, about 90% of respondents eligible to contribute to their DC plan in 2007 and 2008 reported making a contribution (Table 4 ). The average percentage contribution is above 7%, although this average is skewed by a small number of extremely high reported percentages. The median and modal value of the distribution is 5%. 22% of respondents reported increasing their contributions since 2007 and 80% of those who were offered an employer match met the match amount. On the other hand, 9% reported either decreasing or stopping contributions in 2008, and 9.6% took an early withdrawal 4 . On average, 55% of DC plan assets are held in stock, 20% in bonds and 20% in money market funds, with the remaining 4% in other assets (Table 5) Women, Blacks and Hispanics are likely to hold less stock, as are the less educated, older and less wealthy respondents are also less likely to hold stock.
Following Mottola and Utkus (2009), we also diagnose portfolio "mistakes" based on commonly accepted principles of investment. These "mistakes" are defined as follows: (1) holding a zero balance in equities, (2) holding an equity balance of less than 40% (overly conservative) (3) holding more than 95% equity (overly aggressive) and (4) holding a portfolio that is 100% in a single asset class (underdiversified). More than half (56%) of respondents' portfolios have at least one "mistake". Women tend to be more conservative in general, being more prone to having too few equities. As a result they also tend to be underdiversified overall. Indeed more than 12% of female respondents hold no equity at all. Similarly, older, less wealthy and less educated individuals are also more likely to be holding no stocks, precluding longer-term asset growth.
When asked about the value of advice in a DC plan setting, most respondents placed the highest value on advice related to investing, whether understanding the asset universe or asset allocation (Table 6 ). About a third considered setting overall contribution goals most valuable, while only about one quarter placed similar value on advice related to future planning such as tax and estate planning or decumulation. This suggests that many respondents look to advisors for specific tasks related to investment management, rather than larger retirement plan management issues.
To see if this is reflected in their behavior following the use of advisors, we examine data on an array of plan-related behaviors. Simple tabulations of the data reveal that individuals with advisors were more likely to make contributions in 2007 and 2008, and to meet their employer match. However, the data also show that those who received advice were more likely to have reduced their 2008 contribution relative to 2007s (Table 7) .
5 Individuals who use advisors invest less in stocks and more in bonds, and also hold fewer assets outside the category of stocks, bonds or money market funds. They are less likely to be too aggressive, and less or equally likely to hold zero equities, but they are more or equally prone to being too conservative (Table 8) .
To examine the magnitude and significance of differences while controlling for potential demographic effects, for individual i, we use OLS to estimate a set of equations of the form
using behaviors of interest as the outcome variables Y. We now include the indicator for advice as an explanatory variable in addition to the vector of demographic characteristics, X. When the behavior of interest is a binary variable, the results are interpreted as a LP model, as before.
The multivariate regression yields results very similar to the trends in the summary tables, consistent with the finding that these demographic characteristics do not generally predict actual reported advice-seeking in 2008. Controlling for demographics, we find that the use of an advisor significantly predicts 2008 contributions, but use of an advisor also significantly predicts the likelihood of reducing contributions in 2008 relative to 2007 (Table 9 ). However, advice is not statistically significantly predictive of allocation levels (Table 10) or investment "mistakes" within portfolios (Table 11 ).
Does Self-Selection on Financial Literacy Explain The Advice-Behavior Relationship?
Researchers have argued that financial literacy is a key unobservable characteristic that often complicates analyses of advice, and vice versa. Theoretical arguments about the relationship between advice and behavior go in both directions. If financial literacy substitutes for advice and the least financially literate are more likely to take up advice, differences in observed behavior may understate the positive impact of advice. Conversely, if the most financially literate are more likely to take up advice, as argued by Hackethal et al (2009) , differences in observed behavior may overstate this impact. Controlling for selection on observables using only formal education and experience as proxy variables for financial literacy may not adequately resolve this problem, as Dominitz, Hung and Yoong (2008) show that financial literacy has strong effects independent of both. Hackethal et al (2009) go further by using an instrumental variables strategy to overcome this issue. In our study, we are able to use our measures of financial literacy to explicitly control for selection of this type, which is a major advantage. Our results suggest that self-selection on financial literacy plays no significant role.
We first re-estimate the LP model in Equation 1 with financial literacy as an additional regressor (albeit on the smaller sample for which the financial literacy data is available). There is no evidence of positive selection on financial literacy. However, we find that although having lower financial literacy is somewhat related to advice-seeking, the estimated relationship is very small and not significantly predictive (Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 ). This is true of both measured financial literacy and self-assessed financial literacy. Further nonparametric analysis using a Lowess curve smoother shows a somewhat negative relationship between measured financial literacy and advice-seeking but the result is highly skewed by a few outliers; there is no discernible trend in the relationship between self-assessed financial literacy and advice-seeking.
Consistent with this, re-estimating Equation 2 while controlling for financial literacy 6 in the regressions of behavioral outcomes on advice has little effect on the estimated coefficients, be they contributions and withdrawals (Table 12) , reported allocations (Table 13 ) or investment mistakes (Table 14) . Again, this result is robust to the use of both measured financial literacy and self-assessed financial literacy.
Discussion: Potential Reverse Causality and Selection on Other Unobservables
Our results show that although individuals believe that advice is most relevant to investing, there appears to be no systematic, statistically significant relationship between advice and observed investment behavior. Moreover, individuals who consult advisors are more likely to have reduced their contribution levels but are also more likely to continue making contributions. This apparently contradictory pattern of behavior suggests the presence of reverse causality: individuals who are experiencing unusual stress and negative plan performance may turn to advisors.
In Column 1 of Table 15 , we again re-estimate Equation 2, using total plan balances in 2008 as the outcome variable, rather than a measure of behavior. In Column 2, we subtract 2007 plan balances from 2008 plan balances to construct a measure of whether or not the individual experienced a net plan loss in 2008, and include this as an additional explanatory variable. We find that, indeed, individuals who experienced net plan losses are more likely to consult advisors. The estimates show that, even accounting for financial literacy and income levels, consulting an advisor in 2008 has a marginally significant and positive effect on overall plan balances (and the point estimate is sizable). Taken together with the previous results, these findings reinforce the possible explanation that even if seeking advice may actually ultimately help in preserving wealth, negative events tend to influence advice-seeking (rather than vice versa).
Another complication in establishing causality between advice and behavior is selection on unobservable factors, other than financial literacy. Table 16 shows a fair amount of heterogeneity in reasons given for not consulting an advisor (individuals were allowed to indicate only one response). While the most frequently cited reason was that individuals felt able to make their own decisions (i.e. saw themselves as financially literate enough to forego advice), an equivalent fraction of the sample also cited the availability of substitutes for professional advice, either from friends or family or other sources such as the Internet. Approximately one quarter of those who did not consult an advisor did not do so because of financial constraints. This distribution of reasons is consistent with our previous results, in which financial literacy (or the lack thereof) is correlated with advice-seeking but clearly not an overwhelmingly dominant explanatory factor.
In this case, it is not possible for us to rule out either reverse causality or selection on unobservables. In their study of German investors, Hackenthal et al (2009) use an instrumental variables strategy to identify the impact of advice, employing regional statistics for number of bank branches per capita, voter participation, log income and fraction of population with a college degree as instruments for use of a financial advisor. As ALP respondents report their current state of residence, we collected analogous data for the United States and replicated this strategy using state-level averages for the number of financial advisors per capita in 2005/6, log 2006 median income and fraction of population above 25 with a college degree in 2009 and voter participation rates for the 2008 general election. However, the first stage regression with these instruments is extremely weak (F-statistic < 2, not reported). We conclude that in the US, unlike Germany, local geographical variation in the supply of advisors is not a strong predictor for advice-seeking, and that instrumental variables regression is not a valid strategy.
Experimental Evidence On Advice and Behavior
Without a plausibly exogenous and predictive source of variation in advice-seeking and given the issues described above, we cannot cleanly identify the causal impact of receiving advice on behavior. We therefore turn to an experimental analysis of advice and behavior.
Experimental Design
Our experiment is designed to test the effect of receiving investment advice on portfolio allocation. While we are restricted to the analysis of hypothetical outcomes, there two key advantages: the advice provided is uniform and reverse causality does not arise. We designed a multi-stage randomized experiment in which participants were presented with a hypothetical portfolio allocation task. Participants were presented with six investment options: a money market fund, a bond market index fund, an S&P 500 index fund, a small cap value index fund, a REIT index fund, and a global equity index fund. Participants received basic information on the funds, namely fees and returns, and were then allocate a hypothetical portfolio among the funds. Figure 1 shows a sample screenshot of the task description for the control group. Participants were randomly assigned to either a control group or one of two experimental conditions. In all conditions, participants were informed that they would be asked to allocate their portfolio. The control group received no further information or support before performing the task. In one treatment, the default treatment, all participants received advice regarding optimal portfolio allocation. In the other treatment, the affirmative decision treatment, participants were given a choice and received advice only if they chose to do so. These experiments were designed to allow us to study the effects of solicited versus unsolicited advice as well as self-selection into advice. Figure 2 shows the task description for the affirmative decision treatment. Previous research has shown that investor responses are very sensitive to reported past performance. To see if advice can mitigate this sensitivity, we vary the historical returns shown in the portfolio allocation task. For a randomly-selected half of all respondents, in the Low Returns Treatment, we present returns for the various asset classes that are representative of typical fund performance over the last year, while in the other half (the High Returns Treatment), we present returns that are representative of performance over the last 5 years, which are significantly less negative. Figure 1 shows a sample screenshot with the lower returns while Figure 2 shows the higher returns.
Advice Presentation Treatment: Rules or Portfolio Meter
We also presented advice based on the rules by Mottola and Utkus (2009) in two different ways. To reiterate, these rules are based on commonly accepted principles of investment as follows: 1) A zero balance in equities is not recommended; 2) An equity balance of less than 40% is considered overly conservative; 3) Holding more than 95% equity is considered overly aggressive; 4) A portfolio that is 100% in a single asset class may be underdiversified. Half the participants who received advice (whether by default or by choice) randomly received the Rules Treatment (  Figure 3 ), in which participants were presented with the set of simple investing rules or guidelines in table form. The remaining half were assigned to the PortfolioCheckup Treatment. We designed an interactive mechanism that provided feedback to participants after they enter a suggested allocation. The Portfolio Checkup Tool evaluates the allocation and compares it to the set of rules. A "Green" signal is given if the portfolio does not violate any guidelines, while a "Yellow" or "Red" Signal is given if the portfolio's allocation goes against less or more stringent rules ( 
Experimental Sample And Summary Statistics
All respondents in the ALP, regardless of plan status, participated in the experiment. Table 17 shows the final sample determination after accounting for missing responses and the demographic composition for the final sample. Note that for the experimental analyses, we do not apply population weights to the analyses. Figure 5 shows a full schematic representation of the randomized experiment and probability of assignment for each treatment group 7 . For purposes of this analysis, we focus our attention on the choice treatments 8 . The discussion of the other randomized treatments is held for future work. As a check on the randomization, we tabulate the number of individuals and summary statistics for the sample in of the choice treatment groups (Table 18) , to identify any remaining differences across groups that need to be acknowledged and accounted for in later analysis. The data suggest that the randomization achieves a reasonable balance across the treatment groups in terms of observables, with two possible exceptions: firstly, a skew towards younger individuals in the "affirmative decision" treatment versus the "default" treatment and secondly, a skew towards DC plan enrollees in the control treatment versus the advice treatments.
Who Chooses Advice? Self-Selection and Financial Literacy
About 65% of individuals in the "affirmative decision" treatment group choose to receive advice. We make two observations: firstly, not all individuals choose to receive advice and secondly, individuals do not appear to be randomly choosing to receive advice or not (as 50% lies outside the 95% confidence interval).
The relative demographic composition of those who solicit advice is quite different from those who do not. In the "affirmative decision" treatment, there are clear and significant differences along age and wealth -those who choose advice are more likely to be older and wealthier than those who do not. For the subsample with financial literacy data, we also test for differences on financial literacy. Unlike the observational data, however, Table 19 also shows strong evidence of selection on financial literacy. Those who choose advice are significantly less financially literate. Interestingly, the difference is more statistically significant for self-assessed financial literacy, rather than measured financial literacy. Table 20 shows the probabilities of advice-seeking for the "affirmative decision" group estimated using the LP model in Equation 1. In Column 1, we include as regressors the demographic characteristics from the survey data analysis, as well as an indicator for having a DC plan and an indicator for being in the low-returns treatment, as that may independently affect the propensity to seek advice. In Column 2 and 3, we add the financial literacy measures. The results show that the age effect on the propensity to seek advice becomes insignificant once we account for financial literacy, but the wealth effect remains significant. This is remarkable, as we note that the advice is free and the incentives for the hypothetical task have no relationship to actual wealth. We also note that financial literacy is strongly significant (regardless of whether measured or self-assessed financial literacy is used) regardless of the other demographic controls. However, the relatively low R-squared throughout show that a large amount of the variation in advice-seeking in the experiment is not explained by these observable characteristics, even with the inclusion of these financial literacy measures. P = 1/2 P = 1/2 P = 1/2 P = 1/2 P = 1/2 P = 1/2 P = 1/2 P = 1/2 P = 1/2 P = 1/2 P = 1/2 P = 1/2 P = 1/2 P = 1/2 P = 2/5 P = 2/5 P = 1/5
The Impact of Advice On Behavior
Having established that, in the absence of reverse causality and financial constraints, negative self-selection on financial literacy is likely to occur, we next move on to analyze the impact of advice on investment behavior. Our next goals are to (a) establish whether advice itself has an effect, (b) understand if investors are likely to behave differently towards advice when it is presented as an affirmative choice rather than as a default, and (c) gain insight into the relative importance of selection versus the actual impact of advice in observed real-world behavior, where advice is typically a choice variable. These questions are of first-order importance when considering the likely impact of policy alternatives such as making advice more freely available, or instituting compulsory financial counselling.
The Average Effect of Default Versus Optional Advice on Behavior
In a randomized controlled trial design, we obtain unbiased estimates of the effects of a treatment by simply comparing mean outcomes of interest between treatment and control. We first look descriptively at respondents' portfolio allocations as well as the investment "mistakes" explicitly addressed by the rules, comparing both the default treatment group (with unsolicited advice) and the affirmative decision group (where advice is optional), to the control group (with no advice). For each treatment group, we test the hypotheses that the sample means of these are equal to the sample mean of the control (i.e. there is zero treatment effect for that group).
Note that for the affirmative decision group, the mean includes outcomes for both individuals who chose and did not choose advice. The difference between treatment and control thus reflects the overall effect of being administered the affirmative decision treatment, regardless of the actual choice. Table 21 shows clearly that the mean values of all outcomes for the default group are not significantly different from the control group. Unsolicited advice, it appears, may have no effect on behavior. In the affirmative decision group, on the other hand, we find that respondents are significantly less likely to commit two "mistakes" -underdiversification and being too conservative. This implies that the affirmative decision treatment has a positive average effect on behavior for the group as a whole.
In light of the slightly differing demographic composition between the treatment groups, we run an OLS regression on the whole sample to estimate the following equation
where default and affirmative are now treatment dummies, and we control for the observables vector X. In the terminology of program evaluation, we can think of the default experimental group as being enrolled in a compulsory program of free advice, and the affirmative decision group as a group which is enrolled in a program which simply offers advice for free. The  coefficients give the treatment effects of being exposed to the program, or the intent-to-treat estimate (which for mandatory, full-compliance programs similar to the default treatment is the same as the actual program effect). Table 22 shows the results on portfolio quality, using the "mistake" indicators as outcome variables. The default treatment has no significant effects, while the previously-noted affirmative decision treatment effects are robust to the inclusion of the demographic controls as well as controls for DC plan ownership and the low-returns treatment. For the subsample of individuals with financial literacy data, we also reestimate Equation (3) using both measured and selfassessed financial literacy measures. When we control for financial literacy, we find that the overall effects in the affirmative decision are reduced, but there is still a positive and significant effect in reducing overconservatism. (Table 23 and Table 24 ).
These effects also suggest that, more generally, in line with the message of the advice, individuals who follow advice should allocate a significant part of their portfolio to stocks, but not more than 95%. Table 25 shows that there is no significant average effect on stockholding in either treatment, although the point estimates are consistently positive for the affirmative decision treatment and negative for the default treatment, whether or not we control for financial literacy. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of distributions does not reject the null of no difference between default and control (p=0.996). It also does not reject the null of no difference between affirmative decision and control (p=0.144), but this result is considerably more marginal. (We also note, as an aside, that both financial literacy measures strongly and significantly predict behavior independent of the treatments, in a direction consistent with the advice: the more literate are more likely to hold stock and less likely to commit mistakes)
Further Analysis
These results establish that unsolicited advice has no average effect, but that offering advice as a choice may indeed positively affect overall investment behavior. In the default treatment group, we explore the possibility of heterogeneous treatment effects that might justify the provision of advice even when it is not asked for. In the affirmative decision group, we next turn to the estimation of the actual effects of treatment on the treated, and analyse the implications of self-selection on other unobservable characteristics.
Are There Heterogeneous Treatment Effects in The Default Treatment Group?
Although in the default group, we find no strong average effects, it is reasonable to speculate that perhaps there are smaller subgroups of interest that do respond to such unsolicited advice and that may be targeted separately. In particular, policymakers may consider targeting such interventions to groups of individuals that have lower skills. One conclusion from the survey results might well be that, since the less financially literate are not seeking out advice on their own for reasons that may include financial constraints, and may also be prone to making mistakes, giving free advice as a default may help them. Our results show support for this idea, but the evidence is not strong.
We focus on individuals in the default and control groups. We estimate Equation (3) with the default treatment dummy, interacted with a measure that reflect skill-levels (college education, age or the financial literacy measures). In this specification, a significant coefficient on the interaction term suggests a differential (additive) treatment effect for that group. For this analysis, we characterize individuals who lie below the median value for each financial index as having "low financial literacy" in order to generate an indicator of low financial literacy.
We find that there are mixed results (with portfolio quality as the outcome measures). Specification I in Table 26 shows that the college-educated may or may not actually benefit more than the non-college educated. Specification II, III and IV find no statistically significant differential impacts for the young or the less financially literate, although the point estimates suggest that giving out advice has a salutary impact on the less-financially literate respondents across all the portfolio quality metrics. Overall, however, in the default group, there is no overwhelming compelling case for making free counseling compulsory in this case. (We note however, other results suggest that altering the format of advice can make a difference in lowliteracy groups: the interactive portfolio meter treatment can have a greater effect than the noninteractive rules treatment. Future work will further address this intriguing possibility in greater detail)
Treatment Effects Vs Selection In The Affirmative Decision Group
Within the affirmative decision group, we find extremely large behavioral differences between those who choose to receive advice and those who do not. The findings imply that both treatment effects and selection are present. Our previous results rule out the most immediately intuitive type of selection, positive selection on financial literacy. Instead, the findings point to self-selection on other unobservables such as motivation or interest. At the same time, in line with the intent-to-treat analysis above, we also find positive average treatment effects on the treatedthe advice itself does alter the behavior of the recipients. However, the magnitude of the actual impact is small relative to the difference due to self-selection on unobservables, which serves as a cautionary note for those evaluating such programs with observational data alone. Table 27 shows sample means for recipients and non-recipients in the affirmative decision group. There are large and significant differences in portfolio allocation and portfolio quality. On all four quality metrics, advice recipients perform significantly better that nonrecipients: they are less likely to hold zero equity, be underdiversified or rated as tooconservative. Recipients are also not simply increasing risk-exposure across the board, as they are also less likely to be too aggressive. Table 27 shows that while advice recipients in the affirmative decision group outperform advice-recipients in the default group, those who do not receive advice do worse or no differently compared to the control group who also receive no advice. The latter observation implies that some of these differences must also be due to selfselection along some dimension that also influences task performance.
An intuitive story to explain the better performance by advice recipients would be that individuals who are more financially literate are also more likely to seek advice. However, from the earlier analysis, we know that advice recipients self-select negatively on financial literacy, and in the absence of any advice effect, if financial literacy were the primary source of selection, we would expect advice recipients to perform worse, not better, on the task. We estimate Equation (2) using only the affirmative decision treatment group with a control vector that includes and excludes financial literacy measures. For portfolio quality metrics, we demonstrate a large significant association between better performance and advice that is robust to the vector of regular demographics (Table 28) as well as the inclusion of either measure of financial literacy (Table  29) .
Indeed, if we assume that this set of controls resolves the selection problem, our estimates would suggest very large effects of advice on behavior. Indeed, individuals who choose to receive advice are about 18-25% less likely to have zero equities in the portfolio, or to be underdiversified and about 10% less likely to be overconservative, a result which contrasts dramatically to the zero effect of delivering the same advice automatically. However, we cannot rule out selection on other unobservable characteristics. To try to understand how much of this association is likely due to selection effects, we next estimate the average impact of treatment on the treated and compare it to these differences in behavior.
We note that the analysis in the preceding section implies that the advice does indeed have an effect, although it remains to be seen if this effect can explain the whole observed difference. If advice has no impact on behavior for anyone in both groups but simply acts as a sorting device, we would expect on average behavior in both the (randomly assigned) affirmative decision and control groups to be equal. Yet, the significant intent-to-treat effect implies that on average, the affirmative decision group is either less or equally likely to commit mistakes than the control group.
The intent-to-treat estimate is simply the average effect of treatment for the whole affirmative decision group. It therefore pools together both individuals who received and did not receive advice. We are interested in the average effect of treatment on the treated, or the effect of advice on those who actually took it up. An estimate of the average effect of treatment on the treated is simply the intent-to-treat estimate divided by the actual takeup rate, or, in this case, the average treatment effect for the whole affirmative decision group, divided by the fraction of respondents in the group who chose advice. In a multivariate regression framework, this is equivalent to estimating Equation (2) by instrumental variables regression on both treatment and controls, using assignment to the treatment group as he instrumental variable.
The results shown in Table 30 and Table 31 (which include financial literacy for the more limited sample) are relatively modest. In this case, an individual who chooses advice is 8-9% less likely to be overconservative, but other effects are far more muted: the effects on underdiversification range from being 5% less likely to nothing significant across the various specifications. Compared to the estimates in Table 28 and Table 29 , the magnitude of the actual treatment effects suggests that a sizable part of the gap between advice recipients and nonrecipients is due to self-selection, and that this selection occurs on performance-related unobservables other than financial literacy.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
In our analysis, we find no consistent statistically significant predictive relationship between reported use of an advisor in 2008 and contemporaneous plan-related outcomes. Our results also show little correlation between financial literacy and having consulted an advisor in 2008; in addition, controlling for financial literacy in the predictive analysis does not qualitatively alter the results. Overall, the data analysis is consistent with little or no selection based on financial ability alone. However, this still does not rule out selection on other key unobservables, including opportunity costs of time, and self-motivation. Further analysis suggests that reported consultations in 2008 reflect concerns specific to a period of extraordinary financial stress, and that reverse causality may be a more significant problem than selection in this data. Unfortunately, attempts to establish causality through instrumental variables methods were not successful.
In the second analysis, we therefore turn to experimental methods to try to better understand the causal relationship between advice and behavior. We design and implement a hypothetical choice experiment in which participants are asked to perform a portfolio allocation task. While we are restricted to the analysis of hypothetical outcomes, rather than real plan outcomes, there are several advantages to the experimental analysis. Firstly, the advice provided is completely uniform in content. Secondly, the issue of reverse causality does not arise. Respondents are randomly assigned to one of three study arms. The first arm is a control group, in which the task is presented to respondents without any advice. Respondents in the second arm, the default treatment group, all receive the same financial advice. In the third arm, the affirmative decision group, respondents are given the choice of whether to receive the advice. Only those who choose advice receive it. Comparing the three groups allows us to study the effects of advice given as matter of course versus the effects of advice given as a result of requiring an active rather than a passive decision.
Our experimental results demonstrate that unsolicited advice has no effect on investment behavior; in terms of behavioral outcomes, individuals who are simply given advice disregard it almost completely. When advice is optional, individuals with low financial literacy are more likely to seek it out. However, in spite of this negative selection on ability, individuals who actively solicit advice indeed perform better. Solicited advice does indeed appear to have more of an effect than unsolicited advice, although the magnitude of self-selection effects can overshadow actual treatment effects.
One implication for policymakers is that a paternalistic approach to advice may not to succeed -making advisory services mandatory for every employee may be extremely costly but achieve no real behavioral change. In many situations, policymakers may find compulsory financial counseling an attractive remedy. These results suggest this is not likely to work if the target population are not inherently prepared to take advice, even if they are truly lacking necessary skills.
On the other hand, our experimental results suggest that having employers offer advice as an elective benefit and ensuring employees' active decision-making can result in significant takeup and some improvement of financial outcomes, and that employees with low financial literacy are more likely to take advantage of these programs. To corroborate this, we gauged potential change in advice-seeking under such policy changes, by surveying individuals currently enrolled in DC plans who did not take up advice in 2008 about whether they would be likely to do so if advice were provided via employer benefit programs. A large fraction of non users, 73.8%, report that they would take it up if employers were to offer advice as a benefit 9 . Table 32 shows the demographic breakdown of the responses for these individuals: a larger fraction of women, minorities, and lower income individuals report being likely to take up the benefit. In the sample of individuals with financial literacy data, we also find that a larger fraction of those with low financial literacy report likely takeup.
At the same time, policymakers should be realistic about the effects of such programs. Evaluators should remain careful not to overestimate the impact of such voluntary advice programs, since observed differences between recipients and non-recipients are likely to be highly driven by selection. Ex-post only evaluations are particularly likely to be subject to such biases, even when researchers have access to data on seemingly key variables such as financial skills and education.
At a more general level, the research leaves us with an extremely challenging problem. These findings show that building financial literacy can improve outcomes. However, other unobservable factors such as inherent motivation are also highly performance-relevant and do not appear to be not perfectly correlated with financial ability. Even supposing that policymakers successfully improve financial information and knowledge, if motivation and other underlying factors remain unaffected, increased advice and other support tools may raise average outcomes but also increase the disparities between individuals who are self-motivated and those who are not. These findings suggest that transitioning from knowledge to actual behavior change requires advice and educational materials that are designed to engage rather than simply inform the consumer. Future work based on this research will use data from the other described interventions to investigate whether an engaging presentation format in addition to knowledge content can independently promote behavioral change. Table 9 included but not shown 
